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Times Magazine
on Sunday, October 25th 2004
By Johanna Mcgeary, Baghdad.
Can the conscience of the nation make it
safe for democracy?
The very name Sistani is shrouded in
mystery. Few Westerners have ever met
the most powerful man in Iraq. If they
did, they would encounter a thin,
bearded figure with little interest in
the trappings of office.
Grand Ayatullah Ali Husaini Sistani, the
revered leader of the nation's 15
million Shiites, receives visitors,
powerful and meek alike, in a plain,
bare room in his modest home down a
dusty alley in the holy city of Najaf.
He sits on the floor with his back to
the wall, dressed always in the same
simple robe and turban. (An intimate
says he hasn't refreshed his wardrobe in
10 years.) He is modest and respectful,
and listens more than he talks.
But his charisma is striking. His eyes
"look into your psyche," says Mohammed
Kamil al-Rudaie, a university professor
in Baghdad who has met him often. "He
has a kind of esp for understanding
people and tailoring his answer to suit
the person in front of him."
And when Sistani speaks, Iraqis obey. At
74, the Shi'ite spiritual leader is
widely acknowledged as the conscience of
the nation, armed with a unique moral
authority to arbitrate Iraq's future.
Though he was quiet during the long,
hard years of Shi'ite repression under
Saddam Hussein, Sistani has emerged
since the dictator's fall as the
country's pivotal political figure.
Iraq's Kurds and Sunnis, as well as
Shi'ites, pay heed to his views.
His reach extends as far as Washington,
where he has repeatedly forced the Bush
Administration to yield to his demands
and issued decrees that have altered
U.S. plans for postwar Iraq. The
reclusive Ayatullah inserts himself into
the political fray whenever he feels it
is necessary. Just last week he issued a
statement encouraging all Iraqis to
participate in the election scheduled
for January, and he called on the Iraqi
government to start registering voters.
The powers that be in Iraq ignore him at
their peril.
Sistani proved his authority in August,
when Najaf had sunk into chaos. As the
fighting began, he abruptly quit the
city to seek medical treatment abroad.
The rumours started: Sistani was dying;
Sistani was afraid; Sistani was losing
influence to Muqtada al-Sadr, the brash
young cleric whose militiamen were
battling U.S. troops to a standstill.
But on Aug. 26, as the Americans were on
the verge of assaulting one of Iraq's
most sacred Shi'ite shrines, Sistani
showed he was still the Man.
Straight from medical treatment for a
heart condition in London, he was driven
into Najaf at the head of thousands of
unarmed loyalists who had answered his
call to march on the city. Within hours,
he had brought an end to postwar Iraq's
bloodiest battle. Even the cocksure al-Sadr
bowed his head when he came to sit on a
threadbare carpet across from Sistani
and acceded to the cleric's commands.
In some Western minds, an elderly
white-bearded figure in a black turban
who is adored by the masses evokes the
dark image of another Shi'ite mullah:
Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, who turned
Iran into a stern, inimical Islamic
theocracy. Sistani is of a different
breed.
He has insisted on rapid elections to
choose a government reflecting "the will
of the people" and forswears any
executive role for himself or fellow
clerics. But Sistani is equally
determined that after 300 years of
domination by Iraq's minority Sunnis,
the time has come for Shi'ites to take
the reins of power.
If he has opposed al-Sadr and others who
seek control through violence, Sistani
has been just as rigorous in refusing to
align himself with the U.S. That may
give many Americans pause as they
contemplate the U.S. investment in the
embattled country's future. But
Sistani's moral stature and unyielding
push for a new democratic order have
made him America's best hope for
preventing Iraq from spinning into
anarchy.
His intervention in Najaf paved the way
for the deal cut last week, by which al-Sadr
agreed to disarm his militia and enter
the political arena. Here's the story of
how Sistani became the country's supreme
power and what he envisions for Iraq:
means of ascent in the Shi'ite universe,
the first requisite for leadership is
erudition, measured by a lifetime's
knowledge of Islamic principles and law.
Sistani's learning is universally
recognized.
According to his official biography, the
child born into a pious, scholarly
family in rugged northeastern Iran began
learning the Koran at age 5. He absorbed
the conservative traditions of the
Islamic seminaries in Qum, where he
arrived as a 19-year-old prodigy. Three
years later, he left to study in the
Iraqi city of Najaf, the prestigious
1,000-year-old home to some of Shi'ism's
most prominent teachers of
jurisprudence; he has lived there ever
since. Najaf's schools were filled with
as many Persians as Arabs. Sistani never
lost his thick native accent and remains
an Iranian citizen, which has made him a
target of Arab rivals like al-Sadr who
disparage his ethnicity.
Sistani excelled in Najaf and soon
became a disciple of Grand Ayatullah
Abul Qassim al-Khoei. At the unusually
young age of 31, Sistani reached the
senior level of accomplishment called
ijtihad, which entitled him to pass his
own judgments on religious questions.
Sistani kept his distance from Khomeini,
who was then in exile in Najaf and
already honing his militant philosophy
of temporal clerical rule. Al-Khoei,
Sistani's mentor, preached the
"quietist" approach, in which religious
leaders address matters of spirituality
and behavior but stay out of politics.
Sistani embraced that philosophy.
For 50 years, Sistani has devoted his
waking hours to solitary prayer, reading
and teaching. He has acquired legions of
students, attracted by his charisma,
sound logic, prodigious research and
quick wit. On social issues Sistani has
always been an Islamic conservative. But
unlike many fellow clerics, he possesses
a keen appetite for subjects ranging far
beyond theology and modern science,
history, political philosophy,
biography, comparative religions,
current events and employs an unusual
freedom of expression in reinterpreting
religious questions.
"He merges Islamic principles and modern
life," says al-Rudaie, the Baghdad
professor. "His rules are not frozen in
time." Groomed by al-Khoei for supreme
religious authority, Sistani took on the
mantle of marja, or object of emulation,
the highest rank among Shi'ite clerics,
soon after al-Khoei's death in 1992.
Sistani proved himself an assertive
competitor among the jostling senior
ayatullahs, including Muqtada al-Sadr's
influential father, who was assassinated
by Saddam in 1999. Perhaps even more
important, Sistani inherited the
treasure chest of religious tithes and
pilgrim's donations that al-Khoei had
amassed, a fortune soon augmented by his
own popularity. That enabled Sistani to
fund a vast and flourishing network of
agents and allies. From his shabby Najaf
office, he runs a formidable array of
schools, libraries, hospitals, charities
and even technology centers spread
across Iraq and Iran, as well as
outreach offices from the Middle East to
Western Europe.
Though the marja is akin to a Roman
Catholic Pope in religious authority, no
college of mullahs elects him. Every one
of the faithful chooses a cleric as his
spiritual guide, whose rulings he will
follow. Clerics rise to the top on the
basis of their popular following as well
as the esteem of their colleagues. In a
country given to flash and corruption,
Sistani has earned widespread admiration
for his ascetic lifestyle and upright
reputation.
For decades, he has lived out of public
view with his wife, two sons and several
daughters. They inhabit a humble rented
house a few hundred yards from the
golden-domed shrine of Imam Ali, the
Shi'ites' most venerated martyr. His
meals are the frugal fare of the poor:
tea, bread, yogurt, a bit of cheese,
vegetables. As a result of the meager
diet, he suffers on and off from anaemia
as well as the blocked arteries treated
in London. Tall but never robust, he now
looks frail and old.
Sistani's invisibility is in part
cultivated, some aides and rivals say,
to enhance the aura of mystery that
contributes to his appeal. Says Sheik
Haitham Nasrawi, a representative of al-Sadr's
father: "When he sits behind closed
doors, he is seen as a man who makes no
mistakes." But during Saddam's reign of
terror, Sistani's seclusion turned into
house arrest imposed by the regime. He
endured it as a "religious duty to
defend the Shi'ites' sacred center,"
says Tawfiq al-Yassery, a secular
Shi'ite politician with close ties to
the ayatullah. After Saddam fell,
Sistani faced new threats from al-Sadr's
militia, and now armed guards tightly
control access to his house. He is still
most comfortable operating behind closed
doors; he hasn't conducted Friday
prayers for years and even discourages
the dissemination of posters bearing his
image. He has refused to meet with U.S.
officials and says he will not talk to
any Westerners as long as their armies
occupy Iraq. The Americans complain that
Sistani's reclusiveness has muddied
lines of communication, as officials
struggle to interpret his views
second-hand.
For all his seclusion, Sistani is
worldly wise about Iraq's current
realities. "He has his hands on the
pulse of the nation," says Hussein
Shahristani, a former nuclear scientist
who returned from exile to advise
Sistani. "It's at his fingertips."
Sistani sees a steady stream of aides
and agents based around the country as
well as Iraqi leaders eager to court and
consult him. Sheik Jameel al-Qurayshi,
who represents Sistani in Baghdad's
restive Sadr City district, visits the
Ayatullah at least once a week to
discuss the fine points of Islamic
practice and get political advice for
handling his neighbourhood.
Sistani's declarations are succinct and
to the point. "He makes no decision
until he is totally clear he has come to
the right conclusion," says Shahristani.
"He says exactly what he means, and he
sticks to it, something the Bush
Administration learned the hard way.
"I'm very glad Washington conceded on
early elections, or we'd have been in
trouble," says a Western diplomat in
Baghdad. Sistani "has a few gut core
beliefs, and he doesn't change them."
But Sistani tends to express principles
that leave the details open to
interpretation. He communicates them
before and after sunset prayers, when he
addresses his followers' 1,001 questions
on proper religious observance, social
behaviour and personal conduct. He
engages in a busy written dialogue with
his followers by letter and via the
Internet.
Not long ago, Rifat al-Amin, a
university student in Baghdad, wrote the
Ayatullah to ask whether protests by his
followers should take place in narrow
streets where they would block traffic.
The marja replied that demonstrations
should take place in wide squares
instead. Al-Amin also asked if Sistani
accepted "what was going on" in Iraq. He
received back a simple no.
What Kind of Democrat?
Sistani's personal history would be
interesting but unimportant if the U.S.
had not invaded Iraq. The fall of Saddam
left the country in chaos, with a power
vacuum at the top. The Shi'ite masses
naturally looked to Sistani for
direction, says Shahristani, and the
ayatullah felt compelled by religious
duty to step in. "He believes at a
crisis time like this, the marja must
guide the people," says al-Qurayshi.
So the cleric who had shied away from
politics all his life began to issue
fatwas of profound political importance.
Sistani quickly emerged as a voice of
restraint, urging Iraqis to be patient
and eschew violence. He told Shi'ites to
neither help nor hinder the U.S.
invaders, although he made his
opposition to foreign occupation clear
by counseling citizens to ask Americans,
"When are you leaving Iraq?" He advised
people against revenge killings of
Baathists. Iraqi and U.S. officials
agree that his calming influence was
critical in tamping down Shi'ite
resistance. "That was the only reason
there was no bloodbath in those early
days," says a secular Iraqi politician.
When the orgy of looting after Saddam's
departure ran unchecked, Sistani stood
up to label it immoral and wrong.
Overnight, thieves were piling up stolen
air conditioners, computers, art and
relics at the doors of Shi'ite mosques.
At the same time, Sistani has forced the
U.S. to abandon many of its designs for
Iraq's future. When Washington laid out
a lengthy timetable for returning Iraq
to self-rule, Sistani's objections
forced the Bush Administration to
deliver a swift handover instead.
He has been uncompromising in his call
for prompt elections and in his
determination that Iraqis write their
own constitution. When the U.S. proposed
a complex caucus system for voting,
Sistani responded by putting 100,000
peaceful demonstrators into the streets
to support his call for national
one-man, one-vote elections by January
2005.
With a word, he temporarily blocked the
signing of the U.S.-designed interim
constitution last spring because it gave
too much power to minority Kurds and too
little to Islamic law. When the elected
assembly drafts a permanent constitution
next year, he will insist it maintains
Shi'ite dominance as well as strong
national unity.
The critical issue, of course, is how
Islamic Sistani wants Iraq to be. He has
made it clear that foreign powers cannot
be allowed to dictate the country's form
of government, nor does he want to
replicate a Western model.
He has said Islamic law should govern
family and personal matters. "His vision
of the good state," says a Western
diplomat in Baghdad, "is not where my
wife and daughter would want to live."
But Sistani's aides say he considers the
Khomeini and Taliban experiments in
theocracy failures too extreme and rigid
for modern society, especially one as
demographically diverse as Iraq.
And he opposes al-Sadr in large measure
because the upstart is pushing to make
Iraq a carbon copy of Iran, with al-Sadr
at the helm.
Sistani aides like al-Qurayshi describe
the cleric's vision as a "democratic
Islamic state," a parliamentary system
whose laws comport with Muslim
principles. He would allow de facto
separation of church and state, leaving
the daily business of government to
politicians and technocrats under the
umbrella of religious values. He sees
his role, says a secular politician, "as
the country's guardian wise man." So
when Iraq's elected parliament takes up
issues related to religion, says
University of Michigan professor Juan
Cole, an expert on modern Middle Eastern
history, "he'll issue a ruling and
expect the Shi'ite members to obey."
Since a large minority in Iraq does not
share the Shi'ite faith, Sistani
recognizes his sect's brand of Shari'a
cannot be imposed on the country. Iraq's
system, he often says, is "up to the
will of the people." But once Shi'ites
attain majority power, his aides
acknowledge, Sistani hopes they will
democratically vote in Islamic laws.
Despite Washington's unspoken dependence
on Sistani to keep disaffected Shi'ites
in check, U.S. officials read dark omens
in his increasing activism. They don't
want to set a precedent in which the
grand Ayatullah always has the final
say. And the specter of Khomeini deeply
colors the Bush Administration's view.
Officials are wary that Sistani's
long-term interests are not aligned with
the U.S.'s. Some fear that he wants to
become the political puppetmaster,
running a religious regime behind the
veil of a titular secular leader. Others
distrust his Iranian background and
connections and are worried that he
would take instructions from the mullahs
next door. Sistani and his supporters
may not want a strict Islamic republic,
but if they win, says Kenneth Katzman at
Washington's Congressional Research
Service, "they're going to have very,
very close ties to Tehran." But Iranian
authorities say Sistani has
well-established financial and
philosophical independence from Tehran.
Those who know Sistani say fears of
outside influence are misplaced. They
describe a devout but independent cleric
whose religious calling requires him to
rise above both the intrigues of
day-to-day politics and the pursuit of
personal political power.
"The Islamic view," says Dhafer al-Qaisey,
a Sistani representative in southern
Baghdad, "is that a religious leader
must take responsibility to say what is
right and what is not. Then it is up to
you whether to follow that advice."
Despite the stream of politicos knocking
on his door to seek his blessing,
Sistani has said he will not anoint any
person or party. He even refuses to
allow visitors to be photographed with
him, for fear they might turn pictures
into propaganda.
His overriding motive, intimates say, is
to seize this moment in history to
ensure that Shi'ite hopes are not dashed
yet again. For centuries, the sect has
ended up on the wrong side of power, and
Sistani wants to make sure it comes out
on top this time. He has been adamant
about elections because he believes
Shi'ites can get what they want at the
ballot box, and the rest of the world
will have to accept it. Some Sistani
aides say there is an implicit warning
in that: if Shi'ite expectations of
electoral victory are thwarted, Sistani
could call his followers to rebel. "He
does not think of jihad now," says Ali
al-Mousawi al-Waath, Sistani's agent in
the Baghdad shrine district of Khadimiya,
"but that depends on what the Americans
do." Iraq's Shi'ites, he says, "follow
our marja. If he tells us to die, we
die."
No one thinks Sistani is close to giving
such an order. He is too "humane," says
Shahristani. When al-Sadr's soldiers
disobeyed Sistani's directive not to
spill blood in Najaf, Sistani "wept for
hours" over the young Iraqi lives that
were lost, says an intimate. A diplomat
in Baghdad regards Sistani as a
"cautious man who doesn't go out on a
limb." Sistani's men say he has
repeatedly doused al-Sadr's uprisings
because he fears violence will only cost
the Shi'ites their legitimate claim to
power.
But his aides say he is growing
increasingly worried that the U.S. is
manipulating the electoral process to
limit Shi'ite influence. White House and
State Department officials are concerned
that in a completely open election,
Shi'ites might emerge with an enormous
majority that would dangerously shunt
Sunnis and Kurds aside. The National
Security Council's Iraq point man,
Robert Blackwill, came up with the idea
of uniting members of the former and
current interim governments, made up
largely of exiles chosen for their
ethnic balance and pro-American
attitudes, into a single slate. That
would give Washington's favored
candidates, who have well-organized
political operations but are not
individually popular, a way to stay in
power.
Blackwill, says a well-placed U.S.
official, "created the idea to counter
Sistani's power." Blackwill's office
claims that while he was developing the
plan, some Iraqis hit on the same idea
"independently." But the ayatullah has
indicated he disapproves of the unified
slate. "He's afraid the way the voting
is being set up, the Shi'ites might be
cheated out of their majority," says
Michigan's Cole. The system has also
encouraged the curious alliance of the
religious al-Sadr and the secular Ahmad
Chalabi, former U.S. favorite, who see
in each other a way to trump Sistani's
power.
The Ayatullah is agitating for changes
that would give Islamic parties aligned
with him a higher profile. While the
cleric has not tried to negotiate the
specifics, observers say that is as far
into the grit of politics as he has
ventured. He has to show Shi'ites that
the election can benefit them, says
Katzman. If it doesn't, he risks a
damaging loss of legitimacy among
ordinary Shi'ites that demagogues like
al-Sadr will try to exploit.
The last thing Washington wants is to
help someone like al-Sadr rise to power.
"Sistani's the most moderate Ayatullah
in sight," says a Western diplomat in
Baghdad, "and the U.S. needs to see eye
to eye with him on basic political
steps." That means the Bush
Administration may have to accept that
the version of democracy it went to war
to create in Iraq may not be the one it
gets. To achieve a stable, free Iraq,
there's no going around the powerfull
and preferences of Grand Ayatullah
Sistani.
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